As the World Turns...

- Dr. Ramesh N. Rao

Demand, Not Request!

It is clear to us that the U.S., rather than appealing to Pakistan and approaching them with “requests”, should demand certain steps from Pakistan with short deadlines and ultimatums, such as the closure of all jihad training camps; periodic international inspections that they are complying (along the lines of Iraqi inspections by the UN); expulsion of all Taliban officials from Pakistan; demanding the de-recognition of the Taliban by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (the only three countries to have recognised the Taliban); and full intelligence access and support to the U.S. about all Taliban activities.

This list falls short of military attack launching rights from Pakistan soil. While that refusal is to be condemned as Pakistan’s non co-operation with the civilised world, the above list of four demands, if not met, would constitute more than mere non-co-operation, and should not even be at the discretion of Pakistan. Refusing to comply with these should be deemed an act of aiding, abetting, and conspiring with the Taliban. For readers who may not have followed the first few days of developments, on September 13 Pakistan turned down a U.S. request for deployment of U.S. special forces on its soil, according to the Washington Post.

The issue of joint U.S. and Pakistani efforts to force the Taliban to give up Bin Laden has been discussed regularly for more than a year during visits to Pakistan by CIA Director George Tenet, and General Tommy R. Franks, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command. That itself is indicative of the American embrace of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and all the dirty warfare it has launched from within its national frontiers. Pakistan was a major staging ground in the 1980s for covert U.S. operations and support for Islamic rebels fighting Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and although some U.S. spokesmen have claimed that “relations between the one time allies have soured since the end of the Cold War,” including the short and rude visit of Clinton to not shake hands with Musharraf, many in the U.S. defence and state departments have deep and abiding faith with their Cold War ally, and still continue to exercise their clout in the present administration, and in shaping U.S. policy towards India and Pakistan.

For what else could explain the U.S. now talking to the Pakistani “official”, Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, which was deeply involved in the Taliban from the days when it was a fledgling military movement in 1994 and is accused by anti-Taliban forces of still providing arms and guidance?